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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
European  agri-environmental  schemes  are  being  criticised  for reinforcing  rather  than  negating  an  opposi-
tion between  agricultural  production  and  environmental  production,  and  for  assuming  instead  of  securing
a public  willingness  to pay  for  agri-environmental  change.  This  paper  explores  if  a  regionalisation  of  agri-
environmental  governance  may  contribute  to overcome  these  criticisms.  The  paper  empirically  explores
three  regionalised  agri-environmental  schemes  from  Flanders,  Belgium,  with  the  use  of  40  qualitative
interviews  with  farmers  and  other  relevant  stakeholders.  Building  on  the  Bourdieusian  theory  of  capital
and  the  conceptual  distinction  between  bonding  and bridging  social  capital,  the  paper  analyses  whether
and  why  the regionalised  arrangements  incited  farmers  to  integrate  environmental  production  in their
farm  management  to meet  other  regional  stakeholders’  demands  for  agri-environmental  change.  In doing
so, the  paper  particularly  focuses  on the  role  of  bridging  social  capital  in  fostering  farmer  participation
in  agri-environmental  governance,  which  is  a topic  that—despite  a growing  scholarly  recognition  of  the
importance  of  social  capital  in mediating  farmers’  environmental  behaviour—has  to  date  received  scant
conceptual  and empirical  attention.  The  paper  reveals  that  farmers  principally  participated  in  the  region-
alised  agri-environmental  schemes  to  enhance  the  long-term  viability  of  their  agricultural  businesses  by
building  up  more  cooperative  and  appreciative,  bridging  social  ties with  other  regional  stakeholders.
Notably,  such  participation  is  only  likely  to be substantive  and  lead  to long-term,  pro-environmental
behaviour  change  of farmers,  if farmers  actually  succeed  in  building  up  bridging  social  capital  by receiv-
ing  other  regional  stakeholders’  appreciation  for their  agri-environmental  work.  The  paper  ends  with
discussing  the  implications  of these  ﬁndings  for the  future  design  and  implementation  of  socially  and
ecologically  robust  agri-environmental  schemes.
©  2016  The  Author.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND
license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).. Introduction
To incentivise farmers to conserve and enhance the environ-
ent, the EU has long relied on subsidising farmers’ voluntary
nvolvement in agri-environmental schemes (AES). AES (now
gri-environment-climate schemes—European Commission, 2013)
ere ﬁrst introduced into the EU Common Agricultural Policy
CAP) in the mid-1980s as an option for Member States, and have
een a compulsory element of Member States’ rural development
lans since the 1992 McSharry reforms of the CAP (European
ommission, 1992). On top of cross-compliance requirements (the




264-8377/© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article uncompulsory basic layer of environmental requirements that farm-
ers must meet in order to receive CAP funding), AES are a crucial
instrument through which the EU aims to meet societal demand for
environmental services provided by agriculture—such as promot-
ing soil and genetic diversity, reducing environmental degradation,
limiting wildlife loss and preserving cultural landscapes. In the
period 2007–2013, EU expenditure on AES amounted to 22% of the
total EU expenditure for rural development (Directorate General
for Agriculture and Rural Development, 2016); in 2013, 46.9 mil-
lion hectares (more than 25% of the utilised agricultural area of
the EU-27) were under at least one agri-environmental commit-
ment (Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development,
2015).
AES involve temporary (ﬁve- to seven-year) contracts between
Member State agencies and farmers that stipulate the environ-
mental management activities that farmers should perform on
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peciﬁed parcels of land in order to be eligible for annual pay-
ents. This implementation of AES is legitimated on the basis of
wo core premises. First, due to productivist pressures, agricultural
roduction and environmental production have come to oppose
ne another. And, second, the public desires agri-environmental
hange, and therefore should compensate farmers who  are asked
o take measures that limit their ability to optimise their agricul-
ural production (Hodge, 2001; Lockie, 2006; Burton and Schwartz,
013).
Despite a long-standing and widespread acceptance and appli-
ation of the above rationale throughout Europe, the AES have
ecome subject to fundamental criticisms. One line of criticism
s rooted in the observation that the schemes assume rather
han secure or stimulate the European public’s willingness to pay
or agri-environmental public goods (Hodge, 2001; Matzdorf and
orenz, 2010). Furthermore, the schemes are being criticised for
einforcing instead of negating the opposition between agricul-
ural production and environmental production. As the voluntary
chemes are in direct competition with agricultural production and
arkets, AES tend to fail to incite farmers to integrate environmen-
al interests in their agricultural business development (Hodge,
001; Lockie, 2006; Siebert et al., 2006; Burton et al., 2008; Jack,
015).
Reﬁning the above criticisms, a growing body of social scientiﬁc
cholarship has begun to scrutinise the focus on economic princi-
les that has informed the design of the EU agri-environmental
olicy (Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011). By stimulating farm-
rs to become involved in AES by means of compensating loss
f income incurred from compliance to scheme requirements,
he policy works from the assumption that farmers principally
dopt an economic rationality when making decisions regarding
he environment. Resultantly, the policy overlooks how farmers’
mbeddedness in social networks (and the social capital implicated
n these), and prevailing cultural preferences for landscape appear-
nces within these networks (that structure farmers’ possibilities
o obtain social status through their landscape management),
lso shape farmers’ willingness to manage agri-environmental
menities (Burton et al., 2008; Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011;
aunders, 2015).
Political and scientiﬁc interest in overcoming the above crit-
cisms has inspired a quest for innovative agri-environmental
overnance arrangements. One such innovation concerns a move
way from top-down, vertically organised governance arrange-
ents towards regionally organised arrangements (Böcher, 2008;
neafsey, 2010; Prager, 2015), because “when shifting agricultural
bjectives to a combination of environmental and production goals,
he relevant management level is often no longer that of the farm,
ut rather a small territory, watershed, landscape unit, etc., for which
armers and other land users should agree on common rules and adjust
heir practices to these” (Renting et al., 2008; p. 378).
In this paper we aim to explore whether and why  a regionalisa-
ion of agri-environmental governance helps to address the above
riticisms on AES by inciting farmers to adjust their farm manage-
ent practices to meet public preferences for agri-environmental
hange. In doing so, we are particularly interested in the extent
o which the regionalised arrangements incite, and enable and
onstrain farmers to build up bridging social capital with other
egional stakeholders by integrating environmental production in
heir agricultural business development. Despite a growing schol-
rly recognition of the importance of social capital in mediating
armers’ agri-environmental behaviour (e.g. Mathijs, 2003; Siebert
t al., 2006; Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011; Saunders, 2015), the
nterplay between farmers’ bridging social capital and their par-
icipation in agri-environmental governance has to date received
cant conceptual and empirical attention, which is a lacuna that
his paper aims to address.olicy 60 (2017) 352–361 353
In the following section, we introduce our conceptual frame-
work that principally builds on the Bourdieusian theory of capital
and the distinction between bonding and bridging forms of social
capital. Subsequently, we  discuss our methodology and intro-
duce three case studies that we have undertaken, involving
three regionalised AES in Flanders, Belgium. We then empirically
explore farmers’ and other regional stakeholders’ involvements
in these AES, and assess if and how bridging social capital was
generative of and generated by farmers’ willingness to manage agri-
environmental amenities. We end by discussing the implications of
our work for understanding farmer participation in AES, and for the
future design and implementation of socially robust AES.
2. Conceptual framework: social capital and farmer
participation in AES
A key assumption behind EU AES is that farmers are economic
rational actors when making decisions concerning the environment
and that, therefore, ﬁnancial incentives work best to incite farmers
to deliver environmental beneﬁts to society (Burton et al., 2008;
Hanley et al., 2012; Home et al., 2014). In their review of about 160
studies on factors that affect farmer participation in biodiversity
policies, Siebert et al. (2006) found that many analyses corroborate
that economic motivations play a key role—which is not surpris-
ing since farmers need to manage their farms in an economically
viable way. Yet, Siebert et al. also found clear indications that
“ﬁnancial compensation and incentives function as a necessary,
though clearly not sufﬁcient, condition” to explain farmer support
for agri-environmental measures (2006, p. 334). They concluded by
pointing to a need for more conceptual and empirical attention for
inﬂuencing social norms and expectations, which escape scientiﬁc
attention when focussing principally on farmers’ individual eco-
nomic interests (see also Burton and Schwarz, 2013; Home et al.,
2014).
Observations as made by Siebert et al. have informed studies
into the role of social capital in governing farmers’ willingness
to participate in agri-environmental policies. Social capital can be
deﬁned as “the norms and networks that enable people to act col-
lectively” (Woolcock and Narayan 2000, p. 226) and is embodied in
the ability of actors to gain access to group resources (like informa-
tion, cooperation) provided by being accepted in a group (Bourdieu,
1986; Tisenkopfs et al., 2008; Sutherland and Burton, 2011). Opera-
tionalising social capital principally in terms of the size and density
of farmers’ social networks and farmers’ trust in governmental
institutions, a number of researchers have shown that social capi-
tal fosters farmers’ willingness to participate in AES—most notably
because social capital facilitates awareness of AES and reduces
transaction costs (Mathijs, 2003; Jones et al., 2009; Morrison et al.,
2011). Notably, these studies provide an important corrective to the
reductive focus on the role of economic capital in guiding farmer
involvement in AES. Yet, the studies can be criticised for attending
only to how social capital affects farmers’ willingness to partici-
pate in agri-environmental policy, rather than also to how farmers’
actual participation affects their social capital and how this in turn
inﬂuences farmers’ environmental engagements.
Bourdieu’s (1986) theory of capital does provide an analyt-
ical framework that allows for analysing how farmers’ social
capital and participation in AES interrelate (Burton et al., 2008;
Saunders, 2015). Bourdieu distinguished between three fundamen-
tal forms of capital: besides economic capital and social capital, also
cultural capital (resources in the form of knowledge, skills, dispo-
sitions and the possession of culturally relevant objects—Burton
and Paragahawewa, 2011). Central to Bourdieu’s theory is that
capital can be converted between the three forms via symbolic
capital (status and reputation). Rural sociologists, including most
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otably Burton and colleagues (Burton et al., 2008; Burton and
aragahawewa, 2011; Sutherland and Burton, 2011), have built on
his theory to argue that the nature of cultural capital in agriculture,
nd its ability to generate social capital for farmers by underpin-
ing their social status within farmers’ communities, are key to
nderstanding farmers’ decisions towards the environment.
Following Bourdieu (1986), cultural capital can exist in three key
tates: it can be institutionalised such as in the value of educational
ualiﬁcations and awards; it can be objectiﬁed in goods of high sta-
us value; and it can be embodied in durable mental and bodily
ispositions and skills. Importantly, the value of particular forms
f cultural capital is not universal but speciﬁc to what Bourdieu
alled social ﬁelds, in which actors have interactively developed,
nd come to embody similar categories of perception and appreci-
tion (Bourdieu, 1998). Only when such similar dispositions exist,
an the efforts that actors have put in obtaining and displaying their
ultural credentials be recognised by others and rewarded with an
nhanced social status and converted into social capital (Bourdieu,
984; Burton et al., 2008; Sutherland, 2013; Riley, 2016).
Scholars have shown that within farmers’ communities, farm-
ng landscapes represent a highly valued form of cultural capital
ecause these landscapes act as a “display of the farmer’s knowl-
dge, values and work ethic” (Rogge et al., 2007; p. 55; Burton et al.,
008; Sutherland, 2013; Saunders, 2015) and, hence, an objectiﬁca-
ion of their embodied cultural capital. Farmland publicly exposes
 farmer’s (lack of) knowledge and skills, which in turn informs
he farmer’s social status amongst peers and the desirability of
ncluding the farmer in agricultural social networks. Burton (2012)
nd Sutherland (2013) reveal that owing to the historically high
conomic value of ‘productivist’ farming practices, farmers have
ome to culturally value landscape features that indicate high agri-
ultural productivity, including ‘tidy’ landscapes that involve e.g.
venly spaced, uniformly growing and weed-free crops (see also
anslembrouck et al., 2002; Schmitzberger et al., 2005; Ahnström
t al., 2009; Saunders, 2015). Crucially, this cultural preference for
ymbols of agricultural productivity conﬂicts with alterations in
arming practices that are required by AES, as these tend to result
n landscapes that are less agriculturally productive and more com-
lex and ‘messy’ (Burton et al., 2008). What is more, by prescribing
he environmental management activities that farmers should
ndertake in order to receive a ﬁxed-rate governmental remuner-
tion, AES do not incite farmers to develop, display and recognise
killed cultural competences related to achieving environmental
oals. Rather, farmers are likely to experience peer pressure to do
othing more than following the standard rule (Deufﬁc and Candau,
006; Kaljonen, 2006) as otherwise they only risk losing cultural
nd social capital without gaining more economic capital (Burton
nd Paragahawewa, 2011).
This Bourdieusian analysis provides a rich and compelling
nsight into the socio-cultural dynamics that affect farmers’ envi-
onmental behaviour. The analysis does, however, restrict itself to
ocio-cultural dynamics within farmers’ communities (or, in Bour-
ieusian language, the social ﬁeld of agriculture) and, as such, pays
ttention only to farmers’ bonding social capital—i.e., to social ties
ased on similarity in identity and group belonging (Putnam, 2000;
utnam and Goss 2002; Sutherland and Burton, 2011). In doing so,
he analysis overlooks dynamics related to bridging forms of social
apital that involve social ties across the socio-cultural divisions of
ifferent social ﬁelds (Putnam, 2000; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000;
utnam and Goss 2002; Tisenkopfs et al., 2008) such as between
armers and e.g. country dwellers, consumers, nature conserva-
ionists and governmental agents. This is a potentially important
mission since different studies found that farmers who  partici-
ate in AES attach much importance to being appreciated for their
gri-environmental efforts by non-farming members of society (e.g.
atzdorf and Lorenz, 2010; Mettepenningen et al., 2013; Homeolicy 60 (2017) 352–361
et al., 2014)—which is a ﬁnding that ﬁts in with the growing atten-
tion for multifunctional forms of farming that establish non-food
based links between agriculture and society (Renting et al., 2008;
De Krom and Dessein, 2013; Dessein et al., 2013; Saunders 2015).
In conventional, vertically organised AES, public apprecia-
tion of farmers’ agri-environmental efforts is presumed rather
than actively fostered. Regionalised agri-environmental gov-
ernance arrangements, in contrast, enable farmers to more
actively establish bridging socio-cultural ties with other stake-
holders who are involved in the arrangements. Kneafsey (2010)
distinguished between three analytically distinct modes of region-
alisation that may  enable the establishment of such bridging
ties: 1) re-scaling—the devolvement of governance functions to
regional levels; 2) re-connecting—the (re)creation of social rela-
tions between rural stakeholders in situations of co-presence; and
3) re-spacing—the (re)creation of social relations between rural
stakeholders that are distant in time and space with the use of infor-
mational arrangements such as labels and other symbolic tokens.
Following the theory of capital as outlined above, such modes of
regionalised agri-environmental governance will only yield bridg-
ing social capital for farmers if their agri-environmental production
ﬁts in with non-farming agents’ categories of perception and appre-
ciation of agri-environmental work. Whether and why farmers are
inclined to, and succeed in building up bridging social capital by
participating in regionalised AES, are the questions to which we
turn next.
3. Data and methods
To empirically explore how farmers’ social capital affects and is
affected by their participation in regionalised AES, we conducted
in-depth case studies of three regionalised agri-environmental
projects from Flanders, Belgium. In this federal EU Member State,
the government of Flanders (the Dutch-speaking northern part of
Belgium) is responsible for agricultural and rural affairs within its
territory. Since 1999, the Flemish government has—following EU
guidelines—implemented AES that target individual farmers who
are willing to voluntarily contract an agri-environmental agree-
ment. These AES are designed by the Flemish Land Agency (VLM)
and the Division of Sustainable Agricultural Development (ADLO) of
the Flemish Department of Agriculture and Fisheries. Flemish AES
typically cover a period of 5 years, provide ﬁxed-rate payment for
prescribed environmental measures, and leave little ﬂexibility to
famers (they are ‘one-size-ﬁts-all’) (Mettepenningen et al., 2013).
In recent years, however, different Flemish governmental and
non-governmental organisations have begun to experiment with
alternative, often regionalised governance arrangements to organ-
ise farmers’ participation in AESs, which makes Flanders a pertinent
research area (Vandermeulen et al., 2012). Each of the three projects
that we have selected to include in our study promoted volun-
tary environmental management by farmers based on a different
one of the three regionalised governance modes as distinguished
by Kneafsey (2010): those of ‘re-scaling’, ‘re-connecting’, and ‘re-
spacing’. We  selected these analytically distinct cases to include
diversity in our study in terms of the bridging social linkages
that may  be established with the use of regionalised governance
arrangements (rather than to investigate the distinct merits of the
different modes of regionalisation), which is essential given our aim
to explore interrelations between farmers’ participation in region-
alised AES and their bonding and bridging social capital.
We studied the three cases by conducting semi-structured inter-
views with 40 key stakeholders of the projects (Table 1) and by
analysing texts on project websites between October 2010 and
September 2011. We commenced with analysing project web-
sites and interviewing project leaders to gain insight into the
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Table  1
Number of interviewees according to case and type of actor.
Devolved governance of brook
embankments in a river basin
Linking landscape-producers
and −consumers in a situation
of co-presence
Marketing agri-environmental
services through a short food
supply chain
Farmers 7 5 2
Farmers’ unions representatives 1 1 –
Project leaders (governmental agents) 1 1 –
Project leaders (NGO personnel) – – 2












































mNature conservationists 3 
Villagers/industrial companies – 
Mill/bakers/consumers – 
rganisation of the regionalised governance arrangements. Subse-
uently, we selected—with the help of snowball sampling starting
ith the project leaders—members from the different stakeholder
roups who were involved in the arrangements. We  interviewed
takeholders who differed in terms of background variables (geo-
raphical location, age) and relations to the projects (early/late
articipants, enthusiasts about or critics of the projects) to obtain a
aximum variation sample that avoids an undesirable bias in our
ata (Marshall, 1996).
Interviewees were questioned with the help of a semi-
tructured interview guide that was slightly adjusted according
o the speciﬁcs of the project under study and the type of stake-
older who was being interviewed, but which invariably dealt with:
nterviewees’ motivations to become (or not to become) involved
n the three regionalised agri-environmental projects; intervie-
ees’ assessments of the economic and ecological advantages and
isadvantages of the project arrangements; interviewees’ percep-
ions and appreciations of farming landscapes and how the projects
ad affected these perceptions and appreciations; and intervie-
ees’ social relations with other stakeholders of the projects and
ow the project had affected these relations. All interviews were
ecorded and transcribed, and analysed with reference to interre-
ations between the implementation of the regionalised projects,
takeholders’ perception and appreciation of farming landscapes,
nd the pre-existence and generation of stakeholders’ bonding and
ridging social capital.
. Introducing the case studies
.1. Re-scaling: devolved governance of brook embankments in a
iver basin
In the north-east of Flanders, a Water Board1 ran the project
managing brook embankments in the Dommel and Warmbeek
iver basin’. This project centred on inciting farmers situated next
o (tributaries of) the ‘Dommel’ and ‘Warmbeek’ rivers to contract
he agri-environmental agreement ‘parcel boundary management’
ith the Flemish Land Agency (VLM), which is authorised to
ign and monitor Flemish agri-environmental agreements within
he EU Common Agricultural Policy framework. A Water Board
mployee operated as a local intermediary between farmers and
he Agency. Unlike VLM-employees who generally respond to farm-
rs’ demands to contract agreements, the Water Board employee
ro-actively solicited farmers’ participation in the project through
n-farm visits. The Water Board additionally offered to plan and
xecute on-site parcel boundary development in consultation with
he farmers, and to assist farmers in meeting all administrative
esponsibilities that come with the agri-environmental agreement.
1 Flemish Water Boards are governmental agencies that are responsible for water
anagement in areas that cover a river basin, or a part of such a basin.– –
3/3 –
– 2/3/5
The Water Board asked farmers to manage interconnected,
manure- and pesticide-free grass berms on brook embankments.
These grass berms were to avoid the run-off of fertilizers and pesti-
cides to watercourses, and thus contribute to meeting water quality
standards as set in the EU Water Framework Directive. Moreover,
the grass berms were to enhance regional biodiversity and serve as
ecological corridors in one of the Flemish Natura 2000 sites. Finally,
the connected grass berms were to facilitate brook clearance (grass
berms are better accessible for clearing machines than crop ﬁelds)
and with that enhance the possibilities to manage local water levels.
The Water Board adopted a devolved governance approach to seek
for farmers’ voluntary cooperation in establishing grass-berms on
brook embankments, and therewith forestall conﬂicts with these
farmers. Such conﬂicts would emerge when the government would
have to expropriate brook embankments to meet European water
quality standards. Furthermore, the Water Board intended to foster
an improvement in the relations between two of its most important
constituencies—farmers and nature conservationists—by integrat-
ing both nature conservation (biodiversity) and agricultural (water
level management, forestalling land expropriation) objectives in
the project design. In 2011, the Water Board met  its aim of estab-
lishing 30 kilometres of grass berms after two instead of three years,
with the cooperation of 60 farmers (Water Board The Dommel-
Valley, n.d.).
4.2. Re-connecting: linking landscape-producers and
−consumers in a situation of co-presence
Over the past two decades, industrial activity in the port area
of the Flemish city Ghent has expanded rapidly. To ensure the
quality of life in villages neighbouring the port, the Flemish govern-
ment gave the VLM the remit to create so called ‘connection zones’
between industrial and housing areas, which are to fulﬁl different
buffering functions (visual, noise, ﬁne dust reduction, distance). In
‘green’ parts of the connection zones (involving land that is owned
by the government) the VLM had to develop parks and forests. In
‘yellow’ parts (agricultural land), additional trees are to be planted
at parcel boundaries.
The VLM decided not to expropriate agricultural parcel
boundaries, but to request farmers to voluntarily contract an
agri-environmental agreement. The farmers, however, considered
the governmental subsidy for parcel boundary management too
low to contract an agreement: due to the growth of the port
of Ghent, the acreage of available agricultural land in the area
had declined strongly, making the remaining agricultural land
too valuable a productive asset to accept the subsidy. Because
a raise of the governmental subsidy is unauthorised state aid
according to EU legislation, the VLM decided to establish a pri-
vate ‘landscape fund’ from which farmers can be paid an additional
compensation for their parcel boundary management. Considering
farmers ‘landscape-producers’ and villagers and industrial com-
panies that are located near the port area ‘landscape-consumers’,
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he VLM asked these latter stakeholders to donate money to the
und. Besides with this mixture of public and private economic
ncentives, the VLM aimed to stimulate farmers’ participation by
o-planning with farmers which type of trees were to be planted at
hich parcel boundaries. VLM-employees also actively approached
armers, and subsequently representatives of villagers and indus-
rial companies, to solicit their involvement in the project. By
eptember 2011, 17 out of a total of 36 farmers located near the
hent port area had joined the project, resulting in seven kilome-
res of buffering trees (VLM, n.d.).
.3. Re-spacing: marketing agri-environmental services through
 short food supply chain
In the Flemish region ‘Haspengouw’, the non-proﬁt organisa-
ion Regional Landscape Haspengouw (RLH)2 started the project
.akkerbrood (‘brood’ means ‘bread’; ‘b.akker’ is a conﬂation of the
utch words for ‘baker’ [‘bakker’] and ‘arable ﬁeld’ [‘akker’]). This
roject grew out of a larger project in which municipalities who
ere located in the province Limburg (in which Haspengouw is sit-
ated) had been asked to ‘adopt’ one endogenous plant or animal,
nd in this way commit itself to creating favourable living con-
itions for these species and to sensitise their inhabitants about
he need to conserve the species. Two municipalities had chosen
o adopt a farmland bird, and had asked the RLH to design a plan
f action. The RLH came up with the regional bread supply chain
roject, which centred on integrating farmland bird protection in
he production and marketing of bread. Farmers located in Haspen-
ouw were asked to grow wheat and harvest 90% of it in autumn;
0% was to be left on the ﬁeld as winter feed and a hiding place
or farmland birds until spring arises at a location of the farmers’
hoice. The harvested wheat was ground by a regional mill, and
ransported to bakeries in Limburg who were free to add up to
0% of the ingredients of the b.akkerbrood ﬂour before baking the
read, and thus to work in an ‘artisanal’ way. The bread was labelled
nd sold in bags including information on the bird-friendly farming
ethod and the regional provenance of the bread (RLH, n.d.).
The project had three main aims: improving the living condi-
ions of farmland birds; raising public awareness about the need
o protect and enhance farmland biodiversity; and managing an
cologically sound food supply chain that operated without govern-
ental subsidies. To meet these three aims, RLH chose to focus its
roject on the production of wheat which is a popular feed for farm-
and birds, and bread which is a Flemish staple food. At its height
n terms of numbers of involved stakeholders by September 2011,
he project had involved one mill, 27 bakeries, and three farmers
ho cultivated wheat on in total ten hectares. Two  farmers had,
owever, already left the project, for reasons discussed below.
. Results
In the following two subsections, we empirically explore how
he involvement of farmers and of other stakeholders in the three
egionalised agri-environmental governance arrangements were
enerative of and generated by these agents’ bonding and bridging
ocial capital. In the ﬁrst subsection, we discuss the involvement of
armers in the three projects. Subsequently, we discuss other stake-
olders’ participation in—and appreciation of—the three projects.
2 A ‘Regional Landscape’ is an association of provincial and municipal govern-
ents, and organisations that represent nature conservation, tourism, hunting and
gricultural interests. Regional Landscapes aim to create social support for land-
cape and nature management within regions that are considered to have a distinct
andscape-identity, and which typically cover several municipalities.olicy 60 (2017) 352–361
5.1. Farmer participation in the regionalised AES
In Flanders, most farmland is located in peri-urban areas (Meeus
and Gulinck, 2008), in which—as the project leader of the brook
embankments management project phrased it—“farmland is being
sacriﬁced for everything that requires land: buildings, industry, roads,
nature conservation areas. . . so the pressure on [farm]land is very
high”.3 In recent years, farmers have seen farmland that was consid-
ered of high nature value—including parcels that had been enrolled
in AES—being legally reclassiﬁed into a protected wildlife area
(Mettepenningen et al., 2013). This has caused farmers to “fear that
it [a conversion of agricultural land into AES land] won’t be tempo-
rary. That they’ll say: ‘it should stay as it is now’. Then you’ve lost that
piece of land. But if you need it, you should be able to use it again. . .to
feed the people”. Against this background, all interviewed farmers
responded to the question of how they perceived the land that they
had enrolled in the regionalised AES, by emphasising that it was  and
should remain farmland. The farmers clariﬁed that they considered
and managed the AES land as “extensive farmland”, which implied
that they were careful to keep it in an “agricultural condition” (weed
and pest free) and if possible agriculturally productive (by e.g. reap-
ing ﬁre wood from trees and nutrient-poor horse feed from grass
berms). In doing so, the farmers aimed to make some extra money,
and to limit the nature value of their agri-environmental ameni-
ties so as to avoid that they would eventually lose the legal right to
farm on the AES land: e.g. “if I see a tree starting to grow next to a
brook. . .then I remove it, otherwise I will not be allowed to cut it later
on and I’ll be stuck with it”.
Moreover, the farmers managed their AES land as ‘extensive
farmland’ because they attached much importance to keeping their
land ‘tidy’ (in Dutch: “proper”, which apart from ‘tidy’ also means
‘clean’ and ‘well-maintained’). The farmers elucidated that work-
ing tidily was  central to their self-image and self-esteem: “keeping
crops tidy, that’s my source of professional pride”, and “nature must be
tidy, otherwise I’m not happy with myself—it must be maintained” (see
also Vanslembrouck et al., 2002; Silvasti, 2003; Dessein and Nevens,
2007). In part, agricultural structural changes had fostered this
disposition (see also Haggerty et al., 2009; Sutherland, 2013): “agri-
culture has developed in such a way that you have to produce as much
as possible on as little land possible. We  do not [any longer] select our
seeds; that’s done by seed-breeding companies. We  are stuck within
all kinds of legislative frameworks. So what remains, what makes me
proud professionally, is to keep my crops as tidy as possible”. Addi-
tionally, peer-pressure incited farmers to maintain their AES land
tidy. Not only did farmers consider it their responsibility to forestall
negative impacts of their AES land on the agricultural productivity
of neighbouring farms, which would e.g. occur when weeds would
sprout or trees would throw large shadows on adjoining land. But
the farmers also indicated that their peers initially condemned their
participation in the regionalised AES in terms ranging from “a real
farmer doesn’t do that [participate]. . .a real farmer grows food” to
calling them “a bad farmer”, “a ‘green one’ [a nature conservationist
instead of a farmer] or sloppy”, “no longer a real farmer but a ‘quit-
ter”’, or even a “corruptor of the trade”.  To counter such negative
perceptions and forestall signiﬁcant status loss amongst peers, one
farmer who  participated in the short bread supply chain preferred
to locate his agri-environmental amenities “only on places where it
isn’t visible to everyone. Otherwise other farmers can see that it isn’t
tidy”4 (cf. Burton et al., 2008; Saunders, 2015). Others aimed to
maintain their AES land as tidy as possible (by e.g. cutting existing
3 All quotes from the interviewees are translated by the author.
4 This farmer left this project because his involvement in the project made him feel
a  ‘bad farmer’ for two  reasons: it proved impossible to keep his land tidy while leav-
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rees before planting new ones to ensure a uniform growth of trees
n their land, and mowing grass berms as soon as this was contrac-
ually permitted). In this way, they aimed to demonstrate to their
eers that they weren’t simply giving up farmland and remained
good farmers’ (Silvasti, 2003; Sutherland, 2013; Saunders, 2015;
aylor and Van Grieken 2015; Riley, 2016): “farmers keep a good
ye on each other to see who do and do not participate. So all [AES
and] is neatly maintained”.
Corroborating other Bourdieusian analyses of (UK, German,
wedish) farmers’ participation in AES (Burton et al., 2008;
aunders, 2015), the above ﬁndings show that the farmers were
ituated a social ﬁeld in which tidy and agriculturally produc-
ive farmland represented an important source of cultural capital.
esultantly, by participating in the regionalised AES, the farm-
rs risked incurring losses in social status and bonding social
apital—which they aimed to limit by maintaining their agri-
nvironmental amenities tidy. When aiming to grasp why the
armers nonetheless chose to participate in the regionalised
rojects, one obvious assertion would be that the farmers acted on
tilitarian grounds and that the remunerations that they received
mply compensated for their losses in agricultural productivity
nd, possibly, also in cultural and social capital. Yet, while the
armers welcomed the ﬁxed source of income in times of highly
uctuating agricultural prices, most argued that “one shouldn’t
participate] because of the remuneration, as I don’t think that the
emuneration compensates for all losses [in agricultural productiv-
ty]”. Nevertheless, all farmers considered the remuneration a sine
ua non—both because “as  long as I am ﬁnancially compensated, I can
xplain to other farmers why I do it [participate]”, and because “it is a
orm of respect: you receive a remuneration because you do something
for society]”.
This latter argument brings us to the principle reason why the
ajority of farmers did join the regionalised agri-environmental
rojects: the farmers considered their participation a possibility
o turn oppositional relations with non-farming stakeholders into
ore co-operative and mutually respectful social ties (cf. De Loë
t al., 2015; Taylor and Van Grieken 2015). By demonstrating that
hey were “willing and able to take responsibility” for meeting envi-
onmental objectives, the farmers wanted to offer governmental
gencies and other stakeholders an alternative to expropriating
armland that “is a much cheaper solution, which can be realised much
uicker than when the government has to do it all by itself [through
xpensive and lengthy expropriation procedures]”. Expressing a line
f thought shared by most of the farmers, one farmer stipulated that
e voluntarily planted buffering trees “not because I want to make
oney by doing so [but because] otherwise there’s a larger chance that
he parcel boundaries will be expropriated”.
Furthermore, the farmers chose to participate in the projects
n which they could co-plan with project personnel where agri-
nvironmental amenities would be located and/or which type of
ora would be planted, so as to convey to governmental agents
hat they can “achieve much more by cooperating with farmers” than
y commanding and controlling them. According to the farmers,
nvironmental production does not necessarily oppose agricultural
roduction as long as it is carefully ﬁtted in with farm-speciﬁc land
ses patterns (by e.g. planting trees only next to meadows, instead
f next to crop ﬁelds where shadows decrease yields and roots may
amage ploughs). The farmers complained that conventional AES
ail to address their willingness to sustainably integrate environ-
ental production in their farm management—but rather trigger
armers’ resistance to agri-environmental measures—because they
equire the implementation of standardised measures that often
ith ‘weeds and vermin’, and the project leader had openly questioned the quality
f the wheat that he had produced.olicy 60 (2017) 352–361 357
conﬂict with agricultural production practices (cf. Kaljonen, 2006;
Morris, 2006). As one farmer argued: “Currently trees are cut in the
dark because it is prohibited to cut one. But [governmental agents]
have to think along with farmers. If I say: ‘that tree is in the way for
that reason’ [it obstructed the movements of hay loaders], then they
should say: ‘okay, you may cut it if you plant two trees over there. . ..’
That’s how it should go. You have to come to the farm to observe and
understand what a farmer wants.”
Finally, by joining the regionalised AES, the farmers aimed to
improve their general public image and, more speciﬁcally, their
relations with regional stakeholders like nature conservationists,
neighbouring citizens and consumers in order to secure their “social
license to produce”. The farmers who participated in the short bread
supply chain project feared that the current EU subsidies for agri-
environmental management only contribute to rather than help
to overcome a bad public image of agriculture, “because every-
body knows how high the EU subsidies are and how much money is
being collected [by farmers].” To show that farmers are not simply
into agri-environmental management to make some easy money,
but that farmers are instead willing to actively meet public (in
this case: consumer) demand for agri-environmental change, they
participated in the b.akkerbrood project. The farmers who par-
ticipated in the other two  projects principally aimed to improve
their relations with nature conservationists and fellow villagers,
who threatened their livelihoods by e.g. advocating a legal reclas-
siﬁcation of farmland into a nature conversation area and by
protesting against farmers’ municipal environmental license appli-
cations. These farmers participated in the projects starting from
the idea that “if you cooperate, they [nature conservationists and fel-
low villagers] have less reasons to make strict demands or start to
expropriate land or whatever it is that they can do”, and to convince
non-farming regional stakeholders that “agriculture is here and it
should stay here. . .because we also maintain the landscape”.
In sum, farmers principally enrolled themselves in the region-
alised AES to display their willingness to voluntarily meet public
demands for agri-environmental change—and in this way elicit
more cooperative and appreciative stances by governmental
agents, nature conservationists and citizen-consumers. By build-
ing up such bridging social capital, the farmers aimed to avoid and
overcome conﬂicts with non-farming stakeholders that threatened
their farms’ long-term viability. Following this line of reasoning,
the farmers joined the regionalised AES voluntarily, yet also out
of necessity: “if you don’t cooperate, then you get such a bad pub-
lic image that the pressure will rise too much, and [your land] will
be expropriated by the government.” Various farmers indicated that
this perceived necessity, along with the evidence that they pro-
vided that AES land could be maintained tidy and as ‘extensive
farmland’, convinced a growing number of their peers that man-
aging the agri-environmental amenities was a sign of good farm
management (cf. Sutherland, 2013): “when one farmer sees it at his
neighbour, then he becomes dragged along and sees that it’s actually an
advantage, rather than a disadvantage”. At the same time, however,
the farmers stressed that their participation should be considered
an experiment. If the other stakeholders would not reconsider their
oppositional and unappreciative stances towards the farmers, then
the farmers would cease to participate in the regionalised AES: “if
you don’t get anything in return, then it’s over. Then it ends after the
5 years [to which the farmers contractually committed themselves]”.
Whether the non-farming stakeholders appreciated farmers’ agri-
environmental efforts and considered them a basis for building up
bridging social capital as the farmers hoped, are the questions to
which we  turn next.
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.2. Other stakeholders’ involvement in the regionalised AES
Farmers who managed grass berms at brook embankments inter
lia aimed to overcome oppositional relations with nature con-
ervationists by voluntarily helping to meet regional ecological
bjectives. We  interviewed three regional nature conservationists
ho appreciated “that they [the farmers] show that they do have
omething of a ‘heart for nature”’. Yet, the nature conservationists
lso held that regional farmers tend to fail to “distinguish between
eal nature, so to speak, and agricultural nature”, the former being
ar more biodiverse. Therefore, the nature conservationists criti-
ised the brook embankments management project for enabling
armers to manage their grass berms as extensive agricultural land,
ccording to their preferences for agricultural nature. Such ‘tidy’
anagement would not only inhibit the enhancement of biodiver-
ity, but even lead to “a more monotonous landscape”  and thus a
iodiversity decline as all the brook embankments were uniformly
ransformed into “a strip of grassland that will be mowed twice a
ear”. The nature conservationists lamented that they were only
nformed about rather than actively involved in the design of the
roject. Such an involvement could help to ensure an integration
f nature conservation objectives in the management of the brook
mbankments and contribute to overcoming deep-seated misun-
erstandings: “I sense that farmers would appreciate it if we could
learly give our opinion. Their biggest fear is that they cannot continue
o farm on their land. . .but they currently have no clue what we actu-
lly want.” Resultantly, the nature conservationists concluded that
he project was “a missed opportunity to bring our groups [of farmers
nd nature conservationists] a bit closer together.”
Similarly, a VLM employee who was responsible for contract-
ng farmland bird AES in the region of Haspengouw, welcomed
he short bread supply chain project for “bringing the problem [of
eclining farmland bird populations] to the attention” of farmers and
itizen-consumers. Yet, by allowing the farmers to choose where to
eave the 10% of unharvested wheat during the wintertime, it would
redominantly be located in areas that are according to scientiﬁc
tudies unattractive for farmland birds. As a result, the b.akkerbrood
roject would largely fail to contribute to farmland bird protection.
In the context of the buffering trees management project,
illagers also fundamentally criticised the project’s design and
mplementation. In this context, the villagers were—together with
ndustrial companies—asked to ﬁnancially support farmers who
ere willing to plant buffering trees. The villagers, however, unan-
mously refused to donate money to the project. After having
ollectively lost much land to the expansion of the port of Ghent
n recent years, villagers argued that it was up to the government
nd to industrial companies, rather than to villagers, to ensure that
uffering trees would be planted. Furthermore, villagers stipulated
hat they were principally concerned about whether or not they
ould enjoy buffering trees when looking out of their windows or
alking through their neighbourhoods. From this perspective, they
enounced the project’s focus on ‘landscape production’ by farmers
nly: villagers saw no legitimate reason to differentiate between
lanting trees on farmland and on other types of land (including
ome gardens), and to distinguish between farmers and villagers
s respectively ‘landscape producers’ and ‘landscape consumers’.
ather, villagers contested the project for “remunerating farmers
or planting trees that they cut illegally in the past”—including just
efore planting new trees—and considered it “absolutely not done
o ask villagers who haven’t  cut the trees to pay farmers to replant
hem”. While the villagers hoped that “farmers will start to see that
here are also advantages to planting trees”, they argued that the
armers participated “for nothing but the remuneration” and held
hat “many more initiatives and time will be required” before farmers’
gri-environmental management may  serve as a basis for improved
elations between farmers and neighbouring villagers.olicy 60 (2017) 352–361
While villagers unanimously refused to ﬁnancially support
farmers’ parcel boundary management, 20 industrial companies
did donate a total of D 85.000 to the project. Company-
representatives indicated that their companies did not support
the project to promote green buffers around their own  premises;
in fact, none of the planted trees were located near the intervie-
wees’ companies nor in between these companies and the villages.
Rather, the companies donated money to demonstrate their will-
ingness to invest in a green regional landscape in which different
land-uses can coexist, and thus “maintain in good standing with the
villagers [who live in the Ghent harbour zone], because this guar-
antees our continuity”.  Hence, what principally mattered for the
companies was  not who planted and maintained the trees in what
exact place, but that it was  done properly somewhere in the area
with their ﬁnancial support, in a way  that was  appreciated by the
villagers. Hence, the companies’ support for the project did not nec-
essarily express an appreciation of farmers’ willingness to plant
and maintain trees: rather, two of the three interviewed company
representatives joined the villagers in criticising the project for
addressing only farmers as ‘landscape producers’, and the farm-
ers for cutting existing trees before planting new ones and for
participating only to make some extra money. Lacking trust in farm-
ers’ willingness to maintain the green buffers in the long run, and
in view of the villagers’ lack of support and appreciation for the
project, a company representative had come to the conclusion that
“the project is a partial failure”.
In the context of b.akkerbrood project, ﬁnally, a mill, bakers and
consumers were connected to farmers’ agri-environmental man-
agement through a regional bread supply chain. The mill concerned
a relatively small company that considered the project an oppor-
tunity to co-create and tap into an economically and ecologically
sound niche market. It was  the only regional mill that proved will-
ing and able to join the project: larger mills could not grind the
relatively small quantity of wheat proﬁtably, while other small
mills failed to meet operational food safety standards as laid down
by the Belgian federal government. From this regionally unique
position, the mill had decided to join the b.akkerbrood project and
to cooperate with the project leader from the RLH to “search for
win-win situations for all stakeholders, starting from [the ideas of a]
short supply chain and securing biodiversity”.
All three interviewed bakers indicated that they sold the bread
because they appreciated the high quality of the ﬂour and the free-
dom to mix  ingredients of their choice in it, which enabled them
to “respond to the local market and adjust the b.akkerbrood to the
taste of the customers”.  Moreover, the bakers considered the bread
an opportunity to meet consumer demand for regional products
and in this way differentiate their bakeries from other bakeries
and, especially, from supermarket bread sections. While one of the
bakers was  fully ignorant of the ecological rationale behind the
b.akkerbrood, the two  other bakers considered the opportunity to
support regional farmers in protecting farmland birds an additional
reason to retail the bread. These two  bakers indicated that they tried
to communicate the farmland bird-friendly production method of
the wheat to their customers. Yet, these bakers also indicated that
their consumers principally bought the bread because of its taste:
“So I do not explain it [the provenance of the bread] elaborately [to
customers]. As long as they like it, it’s ok. As long as you make a good
bread, you’re doing a good job and they keep on buying it.”
In line with this observation, consumers explained that they
principally purchased the bread because they preferred its taste
(“it tastes like the nice farmer’s bread from the past”), texture, and
digestibility over other types of (especially industrially baked)
bread. Four out of the ﬁve consumers interviewed additionally
appreciated the regional provenance of the bread—three of which
considered this provenance a heuristic for ‘natural’ and there-
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roduct. . .to buy a good product and eat healthily”. The fourth con-
umer who appreciated the bread’s regional provenance preferred
o buy foodstuffs with few food miles for environmental reasons,
nd was the only consumer who aimed to support farmers’ agri-
nvironmental efforts through her purchase. Anticipating such
ispersed consumer rationalities for buying the short supply chain
read, a farmer who produced b.akkerbrood wheat concluded that
he project ultimately failed in establishing innovative relations
etween farmers and consumers: “I don’t feel appreciated by con-
umers when they buy the bread [because] consumers often don’t even
now where the wheat came from”.
. Discussion
In this paper, we set out to explore whether and why a region-
lisation of agri-environmental governance helps to address the
riticisms on conventional AES for assuming rather than foster-
ng a public appreciation of farmers’ environmental work, and for
ailing to incite farmers to sustainably integrate environmental pro-
uction in their agricultural business development. Starting from
he observation that unlike conventional, vertically organised AES,
egionalised AES entail possibilities for farmers to actively estab-
ish bridging social relations with non-farming stakeholders, we
ocussed our exploration on what we have identiﬁed to constitute a
acuna in current understandings of farmer participation in AES: the
ole of bridging social capital. Building on the Bourdieusian theory
f capital and the distinction between bonding and bridging social
apital, we have examined how these forms of social capital inter-
elated and were being generative of and generated by farmers’
articipation in regionalised AES.
Our study ﬁndings revealed seemingly opposing motivations of
armers to, on the one hand, build bonding social capital with peers
y maintaining their land agriculturally productive and tidy and,
n the other hand, build bridging social capital with other rural
takeholders by integrating environmental production in their farm
anagement. That is, in line with other Bourdieusian analyses
f farmer participation in AES (Burton et al., 2008; Burton and
aragahawewa, 2011), we observed that farmers’ socio-cultural
reference for landscape symbols of high agricultural productivity
including ‘tidy’ land) inhibited farmers’ propensity to take envi-
onmental action that results in less agriculturally productive and
ore ‘messy’ landscapes. Being situated in a social ﬁeld that was
tructured according to the aims of protecting farmland against a
onversion to other land uses and of running a viable farm business
y maximising one’s agricultural production, participation in AES
as likely to elicit peer criticism and, potentially, a loss of bonding
ocial capital.
Yet, we also revealed that farmers were willing to voluntarily
articipate in regionalised AES to build up more cooperative and
ppreciative, bridging social ties with other regional stakeholders.
s evidenced by farmers’ efforts to maintain AES land agriculturally
roductive and tidy, this aim was at tension with established agri-
ultural ﬁeld-speciﬁc norms. However, farmers’ efforts to obtain
ridging social capital by managing agri-environmental amenities
hould not simply be understood in opposition to farmers’ con-
entional ‘productivist’ orientation (see also Saunders, 2015). In
art, farmers’ participation in the regionalised AES can be com-
rehended as a defensive move in view of opposition to their
productivist’ practices by other regional stakeholders: farmers
edicated small parts of their land to environmental production to
ecure a freedom to run the remaining parts of their farm according
o their agricultural production-oriented dispositions. At the same
ime, we found evidence that farmers’ agri-environmental efforts
ith the intention to secure a ‘social license to produce’ prised open
ow farmers conceived of ‘good farm management’ and associatedolicy 60 (2017) 352–361 359
landscape features. According to various farmers interviewed, their
participation in the regionalised AES convinced a growing num-
ber of their peers that agri-environmental amenities could signify
prudent agricultural business development.
This latter observation indicates that farmers’ willingness to
build up bridging social capital may  act as a lever of change in
farmers’ socio-cultural norms and landscape preferences in more
environmentally sound directions. However, such change is only
likely to be substantive and lead to long-term, pro-environmental
behaviour change of farmers, if farmers actually succeed in build-
ing up bridging social capital by receiving public appreciation for
their agri-environmental work. Notably, the three regionalised
AES under study were little successful in fostering such appre-
ciation. An assessment of the reasons that underlie this limited
success warrants the following policy recommendations pertain-
ing to how future AES may  establish a better ﬁt between farmers’
agri-environmental efforts, and other stakeholders’ demands for
environmental change.
First, project-personnel (initially) focussed on securing the
participation of farmers only, by soliciting their cooperation in
designing and implementing agri-environmental measures. This
focus was  sensible as farmers’ cooperation was  quintessential to
ensure the viability of the agri-environmental projects. Yet, it
implied that other project stakeholders were eventually confronted
with ﬁxed rather than negotiable arrangements that failed to meet
their ecological interests and values. This misﬁt between farm-
ers’ supply and other stakeholders’ demand of agri-environmental
measures may  possibly be forestalled by facilitating more socially
inclusive designs of regionalised AES, in which project-personnel,
farmers and other regional stakeholders jointly negotiate which
agri-environmental measures are to be implemented. Crucially,
such a more socially inclusive negotiation may  help to forestall that
farmers fall back on their routine ‘productivist’ landscape prefer-
ences when co-designing and implementing AES, by enabling them
to recognise the cultural competences related to achieving other
stakeholders’ agri-environmental demands in the ﬁrst place (Rogge
et al., 2013).
Second, the projects under study commenced with an a priori
framing of farmers as the exclusive deliverers of environmental
beneﬁts, and of other regional stakeholders as their beneﬁciaries.
Yet, when adopting a regionalised approach, desired environmen-
tal outcomes are no longer necessarily linked to agricultural land
uses but may  pertain to landscape units that exceed the boundaries
of farms (such as in the case of the planting of trees near the port
area of Ghent to ‘green’ the regional landscape). When aiming to
address regional rather than speciﬁcally agricultural environmen-
tal change, other regional land users may—legitimately—contest
governance arrangements that focus on farmers as ‘landscape pro-
ducers’ only and, resultantly, be reluctant to appreciate farmers’
participation in these arrangements. In these cases, addressing not
only farmers but also other regional land owners as potential ‘land-
scape producers’ may  be more socially robust, and more pertinent
to secure farmers’ long-term environmental commitments by fore-
stalling a policy-oriented contestation of these commitments.
Third, in the case of the short bread supply chain project, the
above link between an agricultural land use and the deliverance
of environmental beneﬁts was  conceptually evident. In this case,
however, we  found that in the ﬂows of the (processed) wheat and
of adjacent product information within the food chain, farmers’
environmental efforts became dis-embedded from their agricul-
tural context and were multi-interpretably re-embedded—or even
fully ‘lost in translation’—in other food chain practices. While this
multi-interpretability facilitated the involvement of different food
chain actors in the arrangement, it also made a farmer conclude
that the project failed in fostering an improved public image of
agriculture as he hoped it would. Relatedly, in the context of the
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arcel boundary management project in the Ghent port area, we
aw that villagers and company representatives expressed a lack of
onﬁdence in farmers’ willingness to sustainably maintain the trees
hat they had planted. These observations point to the need to not
nly facilitate appropriate ﬂows of information between farmers
nd other stakeholders when designing regionalised AES, but also
hroughout the implementation of the AES to foster insight and
rust in farmers’ environmental engagements.
. Reﬂection
Our study has corroborated earlier Bourdieusian analyses of
armer resistance to AES that situated this resistance in farmers’
ocially shared, ‘productivist’ norms and dispositions (Burton et al.,
008; Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011). At the same time, our
tudy supports growing evidence that these norms and dispositions
re open to (incremental) change. Commentators have argued that
n view of shifting institutional (political, market, societal) contexts,
armers are likely to experiment with practices and strategies that
ess faithfully reproduce dominant agricultural norms in a strug-
le for different kinds of (social, cultural, economic) capitals and
ocial recognition by peers. When such experiments prove econom-
cally successful, these may  foster shifts in farmers’ perceptions
nd appreciations of good farm management (and of attendant
ultural symbols) and, hence, in the constitution of social status
nd bonding social capital (Haggerty et al., 2009; Sutherland, 2013;
aunders, 2015; Riley, 2016). To these dynamics of change, which
entre on how external pressures may  incite farmers to re-position
hemselves vis-à-vis one another, our study adds that external
ressures may  also incite farmers to adopt innovative (including
gri-environmental) practices to actively re-position themselves
is-à-vis non-farming stakeholders, in order to secure their busi-
esses’ long-term viability by building up bridging social capital.
Notably, concluding that the regionalised agri-environmental
rojects under study incited a fundamental change in farmers’ per-
pectives on agri-environmental management would be a bridge
oo far, given the projects’ limited success in meeting public
emand for agri-environmental change—and hence in fostering the
ridging social capital that farmers aimed to obtain by joining the
rojects. Yet, the regionalised projects did tap into, and allowed us
o reveal a motivation of farmers to participate in AES that has to
ate received scant scholarly attention: to ameliorate their social
elations with other rural stakeholders. This ﬁnding opens up dif-
erent interesting venues for further exploration.
First, our ﬁndings are particular to a Flemish, largely (peri-
urbanised context in which farmers face much pressure on their
and and to attune their practices to the environmental demands
f other stakeholders. Studies in other regions and countries are
ecessary to reveal the generalisability of our ﬁndings with regard
o farmers’ willingness to obtain bridging social capital, and hence
he pertinence of designing governance arrangements that seek to
oster bridging social ties between farmers and other agents in an
ttempt to promote agri-environmental change. Second, following
ur aim to explore the role of bridging social capital in mediat-
ng farmer participation in regionalised AES, we have conducted
n analysis across cases that covered three analytically distinct
odes of regionalisation. This leaves open the question of the
peciﬁc merits of the three modes of regionalisation in terms of
ostering sustainable agri-environmental change. Finally, the com-
atibility between conventional and regionalised approaches to
elivering AES warrants further investigation. Rather than con-
idering regionalised arrangements a radical alternative to more
ertically organised AES, it seems more fruitful to explore how
aspects of) regionalised approaches can be integrated in the deliv-
rance of conventional AES to ensure that this established policyolicy 60 (2017) 352–361
instrument fosters an integration of environmental production in
agricultural business development, and delivers public goods that
the public demands.
Acknowledgement
This work was  funded by the Flemish Agency for Innovation by
Science and Technology (IWT). The author gratefully acknowledges
the useful comments of Joost Dessein and two  anonymous review-
ers on earlier versions of this article. The author is a postdoctoral
fellow of the Research Foundation – Flanders.
References
Ahnström, J., Höckert, J., Bergeå, H.L., Francis, C.A., Skelton, P., Hallgren, L., 2009.
Farmers and nature conservation: what is known about attitudes, context
factors and actions affecting conservation? Renew. Agric. Food Syst. 24 (1),
38–47.
Böcher, M.,  2008. Regional governance and rural development in Germany: the
implementation of LEADER+. Soc. Ruralis 48 (4), 372–388.
Bourdieu, P., 1984. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste.
Routledge, London.
Bourdieu, P., 1986. The forms of capital. In: Richardson, J. (Ed.), Handbook of
Theory of Research for the Sociology of Education. Greenwood Press, New
York, pp. 241–258.
Bourdieu, P., 1998. Practical Reason: on the Theory of Action. Polity Press,
Cambridge.
Burton, R.J.F., Paragahawewa, U.H., 2011. Creating culturally sustainable
agri-environmental schemes. J. Rural Stud. 27 (1), 95–104.
Burton, R.J.F., Schwarz, G., 2013. Result-oriented agri-environmental schemes in
Europe and their potential for promoting behavioural change. Land Use Policy
30, 628–641.
Burton, R.J.F., Kuczera, C., Schwarz, G., 2008. Exploring farmers’ cultural resistance
to  voluntary agri-environmental schemes. Soc. Ruralis 48 (1), 16–37.
Burton, R.J.F., 2012. Understanding farmers’ aesthetic preference for tidy
agricultural landscapes: a Bourdieusian perspective. Landscape Res. 37 (1),
51–71.
De Krom, M.P.M.M., Dessein, J., 2013. Multifunctionality and care farming:
contested discourses and practices in Flanders. NJAS-Wageningen J. Life Sci. 64,
17–24.
De Loë, R.C., Murray, D., Simpson, H., 2015. Farmer perspectives on collaborative
approaches to governance for water. J. Rural St. 42, 191–205.
Dessein, J., Nevens, F., 2007. ‘I’m sad to be glad’. an analysis of farmers’ pride in
ﬂanders. Soc. Ruralis 47 (3), 273–292.
Dessein, J., Bock, B.B., De Krom, M.P.M.M., 2013. Investigating the limits of
multifunctional agriculture as the dominant frame for Green Care in
agriculture in Flanders and the Netherlands. J. Rural Stud. 32, 50–59.
Deufﬁc, P., Candau, J., 2006. Farming and landscape management: how French
farmers are coping with the ecologization of their activities. J. Agric. Environ.
Ethics 19 (6), 563–585.
Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development, 2015. 2014 Annual
Activity Report: Final, Final report. Available online at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/
agriculture/documents/aar-2014-text en.pdf.
Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development, 2016.
Agri-environment measures. Available online at http://ec.europa.eu/
agriculture/envir/measures/index en.htm (accessed 28.09.16).
European Commission, 1992. Council Regulation (EEC) No 2078/922078/92 Ofﬁcial
Journal of the European Union (Brussels: EU), Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31992R2078&from=EN
(accessed 28.03.16).
European Commission, 2013. Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European
Partliament and of the Council Ofﬁcial Journal of the European Union
(Brussels: EU), Available online at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:347:0487:0548:EN:PDF (accessed 28.03.16).
Haggerty, J., Campbell, H., Morris, C., 2009. Keeping the stress off the sheep?
Agricultural intensiﬁcation, neoliberalism, and ‘good’farming in New Zealand.
Geoforum 40 (5), 767–777.
Hanley, N., Banerjee, S., Lennox, G.D., Armsworth, P.R., 2012. How should we
incentivize private landowners to ‘produce’ more biodiversity? Oxford Rev.
Econ. Policy 28 (1), 93–113.
Hodge, I., 2001. Beyond agri-environmental policy: towards an alternative model
of rural environmental governance. Land Use Policy 18 (2), 99–111.
Home, R., Balmer, O., Jahrl, I., Stolze, M.,  Pﬁffner, L., 2014. Motivations for
implementation of ecological compensation areas on Swiss lowland farms. J.
Rural Stud. 34, 26–36.
Jack, B., 2015. Agriculture and water pollution. In: McMahon, J.A., Cardwell, M.N.
(Eds.), Research Handbook on EU Agriculture Law. Edward Elgar Publishing,
Cheltenham, pp. 222–245.
Jones, N., Sophoulis, C.M., Iosiﬁdes, T., Botetzagias, I., Evangelinos, K., 2009. The
inﬂuence of social capital on environmental policy instruments. Environ.

















RM.P.M.M. de Krom / Land
aljonen, M.,  2006. Co-construction of agency and environmental management.
The case of agri-environmental policy implementation at Finnish farms. J.
Rural Stud. 22 (2), 205–216.
neafsey, M.,  2010. The region in food—important or irrelevant? Camb. J. Regions
Econ. Soc. 3 (2), 177–190.
ockie, S., 2006. Networks of agri-environmental action: temporality, spatiality
and identity in agricultural environments. Soc. Ruralis 46 (1), 22–39.
arshall, M.N., 1996. Sampling for qualitative research. Fam. Pract. 13 (6),
522–526.
athijs, E., 2003. Social capital and farmers’ willingness to adopt countryside
stewardship schemes. Outlook Agric. 32 (1), 13–16.
atzdorf, B., Lorenz, J., 2010. How cost-effective are result-oriented
agri-environmental measures?—an empirical analysis in Germany. Land Use
Policy 27, 535–544 ().
eeus, S.J., Gulinck, H., 2008. Semi-urban areas in landscape research: a review.
Living Rev. Landscape Res. 2 (3), 1–45.
ettepenningen, E., Vandermeulen, V., Delaet, K., Van Huylenbroeck, G., Wailes,
E.J.,  2013. Investigating the inﬂuence of the institutional organisation of
agri-environmental schemes on scheme adoption. Land use policy 33, 20–30.
orris, C., 2006. Negotiating the boundary between state-led and farmer
approaches to knowing nature: an analysis of UK agri-environment schemes.
Geoforum 37 (1), 113–127.
orrison, M.,  Oczkowski, E., Greig, J., 2011. The primacy of human capital and
social capital in inﬂuencing landholders’ participation in programmes
designed to improve environmental outcomes. Aust. J. Agric. Resour. Econ. 55
(4), 560–578.
rager, K., 2015. Agri-environmental collaboratives for landscape management in
Europe. Curr. Opin. Environ. Sustain. 12, 59–66.
utnam, R., Goss, K.A., 2002. Introduction. In: Putnam, R. (Ed.), Democracies in
Flux. The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society. Oxford
University Press, Oxford, pp. 3–19.
utnam, R.D., 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community. Simon & Schuster, New York.
LH. nd. (Regional Landscape Haspengouw) Kortweg Natuur Available at
http://www.bakker brood.be/index.php (accessed 28.03.16).
enting, H., Oostindie, H., Laurent, C., Brunori, G., Barjolle, D., Jervell, A., Granberg,
L., Heinonen, M.,  2008. Multifunctionality of agricultural activities, changing
rural identities and new institutional arrangements International Journal of
Agricultural Resources. Governance and Ecology 7 (4), 361–385.
iley, M.,  2016. Still being the ‘Good farmer’: (Non-) retirement and the
preservation of farming identities in older age. Soc. Ruralis 56 (1), 96–115.olicy 60 (2017) 352–361 361
Rogge, E., Nevens, F., Gutlinck, H., 2007. Perception of rural landscapes in Flanders:
looking beyond aesthetics. Landscape Urban Plann. 82 (4), 159–174.
Rogge, E., Dessein, J., Verhoeve, A., 2013. The organisation of complexity: a set of
ﬁve components to organise the social interface of rural policy making. Land
Use  Policy 35, 329–340.
Saunders, F.P., 2015. Complex shades of green: gradually changing notions of the
‘good farmer’ in a Swedish context. Soc. Ruralis, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/
soru.12115.
Schmitzberger, I., Wrbka Th Steurer, B., Aschenbrenner, G.,  Peterseil, J.,
Zechmeister, H.G., 2005. How farming styles inﬂuence biodiversity
maintenance in Austrian agricultural landscapes. Agriculture. Ecosyst. Environ.
108, 274–290.
Siebert, R., Toogood, M.,  Knierim, A., 2006. Factors affecting european farmers’
participation in biodiversity policies. Soc. Ruralis 46 (4), 318–340.
Silvasti, T., 2003. The cultural model of “the good farmer” and the environmental
question in Finland. Agric. Hum. Values 20 (2), 143–150.
Sutherland, L.A., Burton, R.J., 2011. Good farmers, good neighbours? The role of
cultural capital in social capital development in a Scottish farming community.
Soc. Ruralis 51 (3), 238–255.
Sutherland, L.A., 2013. Can organic farmers be ‘good farmers’? Adding the ‘taste of
necessity’ to the conventionalization debate. Agric. Hum. Values 30 (3),
429–441.
Taylor, B.M., Van Grieken, M.,  2015. Local institutions and farmer participation in
agri-environmental schemes. J. Rural Stud. 37, 10–19.
Tisenkopfs, T., Mierina, I., Lace, I., 2008. Social capital. In: Van der Ploeg, J.D.,
Marsden, T. (Eds.), Unfolding Webs: The Dynamics of Regional Rural
Development. Van Gorcum Assen, pp. 87–110.
V.L.M. n.d. (Flemish Land Agency) Buffering in de Gentse Kanaalzone Available at
http://www. agrobeheercentrum.be/Portals/4/GKZ/bedrijven/
ECO%C2%B2%20infomap%20bedrijven.pdf (accessed 28.03.16).
Vanslembrouck, I., Van Huylenbroeck, G., Verbeke, W.,  2002. Determinants of the
willingness of Belgian farmers to participate in agri-environmental measures.
J.  Agric. Econ. 53 (3), 489–511.
Vandermeulen, V., De Krom, M.P.M.M., Mettepenningen, E., Van Gossum, P.,
Dessein, J., Van Huylenbroeck, G., 2012. Strategieën en instrumenten voor de
vergoeding van publieke diensten van landbouw. In: Final Report of the IWT
Agricultural Research Project., pp. 216.
Water Board The Dommel-Valley, n.d Beekrandenbeheer Dommelgebied. Available
at  http://www.beekranden.be/ (accessed 28.03.16).
Woolcock, M.,  Narayan, D., 2000. Social capital: implications for development
theory, research, and policy. World Bank Res. Obs. 15 (2), 225–249.
